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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
The Government of the United States Virgin Islands (“Government”) brings this 
challenge to the United States Tax Court’s denial of the Government’s motion to 
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intervene pursuant to Rule 1(b) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and 
under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  We have jurisdiction to review 
this matter pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).1
 On April 1, 2010, Appleton filed a timely Tax Court Petition to challenge as void 
the tax assessments leveled against him by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) because, 
inter alia, the assessments were imposed after the expiration of the statute of limitations, 
26 U.S.C. § 6501(a).  Under Section 932 of the Internal Revenue Code, Virgin Islands 
residents, like Appleton, are required to pay income tax directly to the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue (“BIR”), not the IRS, pursuant to the “mirror code”, where the term “Virgin 
Islands” is substituted for the “United States” in the Internal Revenue Code.  Yet, the IRS 
retains audit and assessment powers.  Congress also enacted a specific provision directing 
that if a taxpayer’s income is “derived from sources within the Virgin Islands or income 
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the Virgin Islands,” 
the taxpayer is entitled to certain tax credits pursuant to the Virgin Islands Economic 
Development Program (“EDP”), which is authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 934.   
  We conclude that the Tax Court abused 
its discretion when it denied the Government permission to intervene pursuant to Rule 
24(b)(2).  We will remand to the Tax Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  
Appleton took advantage of the credits available through the EDP when 
calculating his income tax payable to the BIR for the tax years 2002-2004.  On November 
                                              
1 Venue is appropriate in this Court under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A), as Arthur 
Appleton, the Petitioner in the underlying Tax Court proceedings, is a legal resident of 
the Virgin Islands. 
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25, 2009, the IRS delivered a notice of deficiency to Appleton in relation to these tax 
years, despite the existence of § 6501(a), the three-year statute of limitations on 
assessments.  The IRS has taken the position, pursuant to a “Chief Counsel Advice” 
memorandum, that the “statute of limitations on assessment in section 6501(a) does not 
begin to run until a return is filed with the IRS,” not the BIR.  It is this position by the 
IRS, and the resulting assessments on Virgin Islands taxpayers, that caused the 
Government to file a motion, dated June 18, 2010, seeking to intervene for the purposes 
of the statute of limitations issue, either as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2), or in the 
alternative, permissively, pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2).  The Government argued that a 
ruling in favor of the IRS on the statute of limitations issue would have a chilling effect 
on the EDP, as it leaves open to question and subject to audit the tax returns of those 
taking advantage of the program for an extended period of time.  On November 1, 2010, 
the Tax Court denied the Government’s motion by memorandum opinion and order.  The 
Tax Court reasoned that the Government’s interest was insufficient to warrant 
intervention of right, and, because the statute of limitations issue is a cornerstone of 
Appleton’s defense, permitting the Government to intervene would be redundant and 
would risk delay.  As alternative relief, the Tax Court did grant the Government the right 
to file an amicus brief.  Despite this, on November 23, 2010, the Government appealed to 
this Court. 
 We need not rule on the issue of intervention of right because we conclude that, at 
the very least, the Government should have been permitted to intervene under Rule 
24(b)(2). 
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 Under Rule 1(b) of the United States Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
in the absence of express rule, the Tax Court “may proscribe the procedure, giving 
particular weight to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent that they are 
suitably adaptable to govern the matter at hand.”  We can discern no reason why 
permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2) should not be available to parties in the 
Tax Court.  Sampson v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 262, 264 (6th Cir. 1983); Estate of 
Dixon v. Commissioner, 666 F.2d 386, 388 (9th Cir. 1982).  Rule 24(b)(2) requires: 
On timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state governmental 
officer or agency to intervene if a party's claim or defense is based on:  
(A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or  
(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under 
the statute or executive order. 
Additionally, the Tax Court is directed by Rule 24(b)(3) that, when “exercising its 
discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or 
prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights.”  Thus, permissive intervention 
under Rule 24 requires (1) the motion to be timely, (2) the potential intervener be a 
“federal or state governmental officer or agency”, (3) the issue must be based on a 
statute, executive order, or regulation which is administered by the entity, and (4) the 
intervention may not cause undue delay or prejudice to the original parties’ rights. 
The first and second requirements are easily satisfied here.  The third requirement 
also appears to be satisfied, as Appleton’s tax assessments are based on an income 
calculation which takes into account credits created pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 934, under 
the Government’s EDP.  It is, thus, the last requirement that is at issue, namely the Tax 
Court’s conclusion that the Government’s request should be denied due to what in its 
view would amount to a redundancy of the issues and a resulting delay in the resolution 
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of the underlying matter.  Specifically, the Tax Court noted in its opinion that the 
“movant has neither demonstrated that its participation as a party is necessary to advocate 
for an unaddressed issue nor shown that its intervention will not delay the resolution of 
this matter.”2
While any intervention could potentially cause delay, Rule 24(b) requires the court 
to consider whether this intervention will cause “undue delay,” or “prejudice the 
adjudication of the original parties rights.”  The redundancy noted by the Tax Court due 
to identity of interest should only be a bar to intervention when it has the adverse effect 
of “undue delay” or “prejudice.”  See Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pa., 672 F.2d 1133, 
1136 (3d Cir. 1982)( “[W]here … the interests of the applicant in every manner match 
those of an existing party and the party's representation is deemed adequate, [a court] is 
well within its discretion in deciding that the applicant's contributions to the proceedings 
would be superfluous and that any resulting delay would be “undue.”).  That is not the 
case here.  There is no support for the notion that any delay here would be “undue,” or 
that the Government’s arguments would prejudice either Appleton or the IRS.  While the 
issue that concerns both the Government and Appleton is the same, namely, the statute of 
limitations, the Government’s interest in the proceedings is certainly different from 
Appleton’s interest in dealing with this one-time tax adjustment.  The fact that the 
Government’s interest is somewhat different detracts from the argument that the 
proceedings will be “redundant.”  To the contrary, they will be complementary and the 
  This, however, is not the appropriate standard to consider when deciding to 
allow a party to permissively intervene.     
                                              
2 The IRS’ fear that this litigation will be delayed lies in stark contrast to its own desire to 
delay the commencement of proceedings by doing away with the statute of limitations.   
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Government’s interest will bolster Appleton’s argument.  As to the “delay,” any 
introduction of an intervener in a case will necessitate its being permitted to actively 
participate, which will inevitably cause some “delay.”  “Undue” means not normal or 
appropriate.  Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 1259 (1988).  Here, there 
may be additional discovery needed due to the Government’s being in the case, but it 
would seem to be highly appropriate that time be allowed in order to consider the 
evidence it brings forth regarding this issue of importance not only to Appleton, but to 
others, including the Government.  
While we do not decide the “right” of the Government to intervene, we cannot 
ignore its interest.  The Government’s interest is based on its desire to protect the Virgin 
Islands tax structure, or more accurately, the EDP.  This interest was granted by Congress 
to give the Virgin Islands a mechanism to improve its economy.  The Government urges 
that its interest, and the potential harm from the IRS’s audits, is great, citing statistics that 
the EDP amounted to 20% of the Virgin Islands budget and 8% of its employment prior 
to the commencement of the delayed audits and assessments.  Moreover, the Appleton 
case could set a precedent as to future statute of limitation challenges if the IRS is 
successful in the Tax Court on the issue.  Rule 24(b)(2) specifically provides for 
governments to protect their interests in matters in litigation; here, that interest is very 
real and is different from Appleton’s, and any delay caused by their participation in the 
case will inure to Appleton’s benefit, not prejudice.  Moreover, the IRS has not asserted 
that its ability to adjudicate its rights would be prejudiced.   
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Accordingly, it is clear to us that the Tax Court abused its discretion by not 
considering whether the Government’s intervention would cause “undue delay” or 
“prejudice.”  Additionally, as Congress thought it important enough to afford the 
Government this mechanism to improve its economy, and the Rule permits it to protect 
its interest through intervention, we will direct the Tax Court to allow the Government of 
the Virgin Islands to intervene in Appleton’s proceedings pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2).  
Therefore, we will remand this matter to the Tax Court, and require that the Government 
of the Virgin Islands be permitted to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). 
Arthur Appleton, Jr. v. Commissioner of IRS 
No. 10-4522 
                                                                                                                                                
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 
I agree with my colleagues’ conclusion that the Tax Court has the discretion to 
allow permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2), but disagree that the Tax Court 
abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention here. 
 As the majority points out, permissive intervention under Rule 24 requires (1) a 
timely motion to intervene by (2) a federal or state governmental officer or agency (3) 
raising an issue that is based on a statute, executive order, or regulation that is 
administered by the entity; in addition, (4) intervention must not cause undue delay or 
prejudice to the initial parties’ rights.  I agree that the first two requirements are easily 
satisfied here.  Contrary to my colleagues’ view, the third requirement was contested by 
the Internal Revenue Service.1
                                                 
1 The majority states that Appleton’s tax assessments incorporate credits pursuant to 26 
U.S.C. § 934, which falls under the Virgin Islands’ Economic Development Program, and 
thus is administered by the V.I. Government.  The IRS argues that this is irrelevant and 
incorrect.  It is irrelevant because the statute of limitations question does not implicate 
§ 934, which states that the V.I. Government may only reduce tax liability if it is 
attributable to income connected with a V.I. trade or business.  It is incorrect because 
§ 934 is not in the “mirror code” (the version of the Internal Revenue Code that applies to 
V.I. residents, in which the term “Virgin Islands” is substituted for “United States”), and 
subsection 934(b) says that the Secretary of the United States Treasury shall promulgate 
regulations to define whether income is derived from sources in the V.I. or connected 
with a V.I. trade or business.  As the IRS notes, “[w]hile I.R.C. § 934 may provide the 
[V.I.] with guidance as to its tax structure, the Commissioner—not the [V.I. 
Government]—administers the provisions of that provision.”  IRS Br. 64.   
  However, I shall assume (as did the Tax Court) that the 
V.I. Government meets the third requirement, as my disagreement is with the majority’s 
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analysis of the fourth. 
 Although it did not use the precise phrases “undue delay” and “prejudice,” the Tax 
Court concluded that the V.I. Government’s intervention would result in just that.  Thus, 
a careful reading of the Tax Court’s opinion refutes the majority’s conclusion that 
“[t]here is no support for the notion that any delay here would be ‘undue,’ or that the 
[V.I.] Government’s arguments . . . would prejudice . . . the IRS.”  As the Tax Court 
reasoned,  
[Appleton] has raised the period of limitations issue, and we 
presume the matter will be fully vetted during the normal course of 
these proceedings.  For [the V.I. Government] to participate in this 
case as a party solely to make an argument that [Appleton] has 
already identified as a matter central to his case would introduce a 
redundancy into the proceedings. . . .  Were we to grant the motion 
to intervene, [the V.I. Government] would become a party to the 
proceeding in this Court and have the right to introduce documentary 
evidence, call its own witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses of the 
other parties.  Such participation, as a practical matter, could result 
in trial complications as well as delay the resolution of this issue in 
which [the V.I. Government] asserts an interest. 
A20 -21.  Because the Court found that the V.I. Government’s interests would be well 
represented by Appleton, who has counsel and “has made the expiration of the section 
6501(a) period of limitations a cornerstone of his case,” it concluded that the redundancy, 
complications, and delay arising from the V.I. Government’s intervention would be 
undue, and would prejudice the IRS.  Id. at 19.  When viewed together with the fact that 
the Tax Court permitted the V.I. Government to file an amicus curiae brief, I do not 
believe this was an abuse of discretion.  
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 My colleagues characterize the V.I. Government’s interest in this case as a desire 
to protect legitimate, congressionally sanctioned use of its Economic Development 
Program (“EDP”).  I am skeptical.  They cite the V.I. Government’s statistics that the 
EDP accounted for 20% of its budget and 8% of employment in the V.I. prior to the IRS’ 
delayed audits and assessments.  But they fail to mention that the IRS only began audits 
after it discovered widespread abuse of the EDP.  Thus, we cannot attribute a decline in 
participation to a fear of endless audits, as opposed to the IRS’ investigation of possible 
fraudulent use of the program.   
 My colleagues also fail to mention that in 2006 the IRS promulgated a regulation 
that “fixes” the statute of limitations problem of which the V.I. Government complains.  
Under Treas. Reg. § 1.932-1(c)(2)(ii), the IRS allowed the filing of territorial income tax 
returns to trigger the start of the limitations period under § 6501.2
It is true, as the majority states, that “Rule 24(b)(2) specifically provides for 
governments to protect their interests in matters in litigation . . . .”  However, by allowing 
the V.I. Government to submit an amicus curiae brief, I believe the Tax Court provided it 
  Thus, the issue about 
which the V.I. Government expresses ongoing alarm no longer exists.      
                                                 
2 This regulation treats territorial returns as federal returns for statute of limitations 
purposes, provided that the United States Government and the V.I. Government have 
entered into an agreement allowing for the routine exchange of income tax information, 
which they have.  See I.R.S. Notice 2007-31, 2001-1 C.B. 971.  I cannot help but wonder 
if, prior to the IRS’ audits, the V.I. Government declined to share territorial returns with 
the IRS.  If that were the case, the V.I. Government’s position would mean that the IRS 
was prevented practically from auditing Virgin Islands taxpayers before expiration of the 
limitations period.  Surely we can all agree that the IRS has the right, and indeed the 
obligation, to investigate illegitimate use of tax incentives.   
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sufficient opportunity to do so.  In sum, because I disagree that the Tax Court failed to 
consider, or erred by concluding, that the Government’s intervention would cause undue 
delay, I respectfully dissent. 
